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ABSTRACT 
Spain faces the highest unemployment rate among the European Union countries 
(22.2%), and Portugal one of the lowest (7.3%). However, superficially, these two 
countries share common labour market features: they both have the most stringent 
job security rules in the OECD, the architecture of their bargaining systems appears 
identical, and the generosity of their unemployment insurance systems seems, after 
1989, roughly comparable. In this paper we address this puzzle by providing a 
systematic comparison of the Portuguese and Spanish labour markets. We find that, 
at a closer look, there are differences in unemployment benefits (non-existent in 
Portugal until 1985, and less generous nowadays, with the replacement ratio as a 
percentage of a much lower wage level in Portugal), differences in wage flexibility 
(minimum wages by category established by collective agreements are set at a lower 
relative level in Portugal, giving employers more room for manoeuvre than in Spain), 
and, in practice higher firing costs in Spain. We conclude that a key factor in 
explaining the difference in Portuguese and Spanish unemployment rates since the 
late seventies is the wage adjustment process. In tum, the wage adjustment in the 
two countries may have been influenced by the unemployment benefit system and, 
to a lesser extent, by the degree of job protection. 

I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we provide a systematic comparison of the Portuguese and 
Spanish labour markets. At first glance in many respects Portugal and Spain share 
common labour market features. In fact, it could be argued that, with respect to 
employment protection legislation, the two countries have the most stringent job 
security rules among the OECD countries (Grubb and Wells, 1993). The architecture 
of the collective bargaining systems in Portugal and Spain also appears to be 
identical. In addition, the generosity of the two unemployment insurance systems is, 
since the new legislation introduced in Portugal in 1989, roughly comparable. Despite 
these affinities, which apparently make the Portuguese and Spanish institutions more 
similar than those of any other pair of European countries, their unemployment rates 
are dramatically different (see Table I ). Spain faces the highest unemployment rate 
among the countries in the European Union, 22.2 percent, and Portugal one of the 
lowest, 7.3 percent. The proportions of long-term unemployed and of workers on 
fixed-term contracts also differ significantly between Portugal and Spain. In both 
countries, the unemployment rate began to increase as from the start of the seventies, 
rising to around 7% in 1978. During the years 1978-1985, the unemployment rate 
rose on average at a much Higher speed in Spain, to over 20%, whereas in Portugal 
it reached just over 10%. Since then, the profile of both series has been very similar 
but at. very different levels. 
In spite of the interest of the Portugal-Spain comparison for understanding 
unemployment, there are very few studies that address this puzzle, and so far there 
has not been a definite explanation of the factors that are at the root of such a 
different unemployment performance. Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) conclude that the 
only difference between the two countries appears to be the unemployment benefit 
system but that this was more so in the past than at present. In this paper we provide 
additional information to try to advance our understanding of the structural aspects 
of the Portuguese and Spanish unemployment experiences. 
A recent study by Scarpeta (1997) on the international comparison of 
unemployment in the OECD illustrates the difficulty in trying to explain Portuguese 
and Spanish unemployment. The author manages to explain cross-country differences 
in unemployment rates using a small number of explanatory variables: unemployment 
benefits, job security, union density, and employer co-<>rdination. These results stress 
the importance of labour market institutions and policies on structural unemployment. 
However, despite the goodness of fit of Scarpeta's specification, the magnitude of 
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country-specific factors (Tegression Tesiduals) fOT Portugal and Spain remained vety 
large (the two largest country-specific effects). In fact, the estimated model would 
severely underestimate the Spanish unemployment rate and overestimate the 
Portuguese one. 
International studies are difficult to carry out because some compromises have 
to be made in oTdeT to make the comparisons possible. When employing generic 
quantitative indicators of a possibly complex phenomenon, subtle country differences 
in the definition and construction of the variables may have to be disregarded'. 
MOTeoveT, although labour market institutions and policies are often taken as 
exogenous in the empirical studies of the determinants of unemployment, the 
possibility of reverse causation is always present (Lazear, 1990). 
The motivation fOT this papeT does not lie in the differences between Portugal 
and Spain in the fluctuations of unemployment oveT the business cycle, but rather in 
the substantial difference between the two countries in the average unemployment 
rate. A striking fact of the Spanish case is that at the peak of the cycle during the 
second half of the 1980s, with GDP growth Teaching 5.6%, unemployment was 
always oveT 16%. 
In OUT characterisation of the Portuguese and Spanish labouT markets, we pay 
special attention to thTee aspects: first, the role of job security legislation; second, the 
treatment of the unemployed (namely, with Tespect to unemployment benefits); and 
thiTd, the system of wage determination. These issues should not, of course, be taken 
separately. In fact, they aTe likely to interact and to generate different outcomes 
depending upon theiT different combinations. Take, fOT example, the case of job 
security provisions. It is clear that, at the theoTetical level, any mandate on "sevenmce 
payments can be completely offset in a perfect market by a propeTly designed labour 
contract (Lazear, 1990). HoweveT, job security provisions in conjunction witlt lack 
of wage flexibility OT wage compression are likely to affect the long-run demand for 
labour and labouT tumoveT (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bertola and Rogerson, 1996). 
, This may OCCUT, fOT example, wheneveT the generosity of the unemployment 
insurance system is repTesented by a replacement ratio, thus ignoring the eligibility 
requirements and the maximum duration of benefits. 
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The effects of unemployment insurance benefits on (increasing) reservation 
wages and on (decreasing) search intensity are well established on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds. Less clear-cut is the influence of eligibility requirements on 
the labour supply of the employed (Hamermesh, 1979) or on the promotion of good 
job matches (Addison and Blackburn, 1996). In a dynamic setting, generous 
unemployment insurance systems can generate persistent unemployment due to severe 
human capital depreciation of the unemployed in situations of significant turbulence 
in the labour market (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1995). However, here again low 
reservation wages do not suffice to improve job prospects, and wage flexibility is also 
needed. 
Finally, the system of wage determination, namely the role of union strength, 
plays an important role in the "insider-outsider" theories of unemployment persistence 
(Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section IT we start by comparing the 
labour market legislation and labour market institutions in the two countties. In 
Section III we offer a comparative analysis of participation, employment, and 
unemployment composition during the last two decades. In Section IV we tum to an 
analysis of labour market flows in Portugal and Spain. In particular, flows out of 
unemployment will be studied using Portuguese and Spanish micro-data obtained 
from the corresponding Labour Force Surveys. The comparison of wage distributions 
between the two countries is presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI contains 
some concluding remarks. 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES 
1. Employment Protection 
Employment protection regulations include those aspects that determine under 
which conditions the termination of contracts may take place. Tables A I, A2 and A3 
in the appendix show that the legal procedures to be followed in each country are 
quite similar. Specifically, dismissal is tied to the existence of causes which the 
employer must justify. It is also necessary to comply with a series of requirements, 
including most notably the obligation to give notice of the dismissal in writing, 
providing the employee with advance notice -a period varying from between one 
month, in the case of Spain, and two months in Portugal- during which time the 
employee has the right to use several hours per week to look for a new job. Except 
in the case of disciplinary dismissal (a serious breach of contract by the employee), 
the employer should provide the employee with severance payment amounting to 20 
days' wages per year worked, with a maximum of 12 monthly payments in Spain, 
this being one month per year worked in Portugal where, moreover, a minimum of 
three monthly payments is stipulated and no maximum. 
Employees in both countries may appeal against the decision to terminate 
contract. But the incentives to do so differ greatly. In Portugal, the only possible 
improvement for the employee is the possibility of reinstatement, which means that, 
ID practice, appeals are not usually lodged with the courts. In Spain, however, there 
is the possibility that the dismissal may be declared unfair by the courts. In such case, 
which arises when the firm is unable to provide a sufficient justification for the cause 
of the dismissal, the cost of severance payments rises to 45 days per year worked 
with a maximum of 42 monthly payments'. The difficulty of justifying before the 
courts the cause of the dismissal has, in practice, led in Spain to severance payments 
equivalent to those for unfair dismissal which far exceed those in Portugal'. In fact, 
, The latest labour market reform in June 1997 has reduced severance payment for 
new contracts to 33 days per year worked with a maximum of 24 monthly payments, 
with the exception of employees aged between 30 and 45 who have lost permanent 
jobs and have not been unemployed for longer than one year, for whom the severance 
payment remains as before. 
These difficulties arise from the fact that dismissals are not subject to a simple 
formal control; judges must delve into the matter, analysing whether there are 
economic, technological, organisational or production-related causes. Economic causes 
are justified in the case of a current crisis of the firm. which must be substantiated 
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80% of the individual dismissal cases settled by the courts in 1996 resulted in a 
ruling favourable to the employee, or were resolved via conciliation. Only in 20% of 
the cases was the ruling favourable to the firm. Given these difficulties, most cases 
(78%) are resolved before legal proceedings begin. This is done via an agreement 
between the employee and the firm in which severance payments close to those for 
unfair dismissal are agreed, this being the most likely alternative in the event of 
arriving at legal proceedings. This situation may change after the recent labour reform 
introduced in June 1997. The reform has extended the causes that may give rise to 
an individual dismissal, and now includes the possibility of staff adjustments with a 
view to overcoming problems relating to a lack of competitiveness. Insofar as the 
bulk of dismissals now become "fair" ones following this reform, the firing costs 
associated with permanent-rontract employment in Spain will tend to be less than 
those prevailing in Portugal, as is reflected in Figure A.1. 
As for collective dismissals, the legislation in the two countries is very similar. 
The most important point here is the need for administrative authorisation in both 
countries. In view of this requirement, dismissal may in no circumstance be declared 
unfair. Nonetheless, in the case of Spain administrative authorisation is only given 
when there is agreement between the company and the unions. And such an 
agreement is occasionally reached by increasing the amount of the severance 
payments. Collective in proportion to total dismissals are a minority in both countries. 
At the end of 1984, in an attempt to ease employment protection, new 
fixed-term contracts with lower firing costs than the permanent contracts were 
introduced in Spain, for all activities, whether temporary or not, and eliminating all 
previous restrictions. 
It may be concluded that, although the labour regulations on employment 
protection are very similar in both countries (among the highest in the OEC)) 
countries), and despite the fact that in principle severance payments for fair dismissal 
are higher in Portugal (one month per year worked), the protection of permanent 
employment in Spain is, in practice, somewhat stronger. The reason for this is the 
by audit and other technical reports. In practice, the firm must have been recording 
continuous losses for a period of about two years. Technological, organisational or 
production-related causes are justified on the basis of the need to shed staff to ensure 
the future viability of the firm and of employment by means of a more suitable 
organisation of resources. 
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difficulty of justifying the cause of dismissal before the courts, which encourages 
finns to agree on severance payments to their employees equivalent to those for 
unfair dismissal (45 days per year worked). Notably, however, the recent labour 
market reform in June 1997 may, in practice, entail a significant reduction in 
severance payments, since the valid reference will now be fair dismissal, which has 
a lower associated cost than that prevailing in Portugal (20 days per year worked). 
2. Unemployment Benefits 
There have been important differences between Portugal and Spain in the 
unemployment benefits regulations during the eighties and nineties. In Spain the 
generosity of benefits increased ( 1984, 1989) and was subsequently reduced (1992) 
in order to counter the expansion of spending (see Garcia·Perea and Martin, 1996). 
Between 1980 and 1993, unemployment coverage in Spain, driven by the growth of 
assistance benefits, virtually doubled and rose to around 70% (see Figure 8). In 
Portugal, before 1985 only unemployment assistance benefits existed covering less 
than 10% of the jobless, and in 1985 unemployment insurance benefits were 
introduced. In 1989 eligibility criteria for the insurance benefit were eased and the 
maximum duration period was increased, both for insurance and for assistance 
benefits. The immediate outcome was a sharp increase in coverage, which tended to 
widen as a result of the economic recession to rates of around 40 to 50 percent 
maximum. Conversely, in Spain, there was an opposite-running movement following 
the legislative change in 1992 which was aimed at reducing the replacement ratio and 
tightening eligibility criteria. This was responsible for part of the reduction in the 
coverage rate by about 15 percentage points, from 70% to almost 55%, still higher 
than that prevailing in Portugal. 
Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix draw together the eligibility conditions, 
maximum duration and replacement ratio of the unemployment insurance and 
assistance benefits. It may be concluded from the comparison between both countries 
that the qualifying conditions in Portugal for the unemployment insurance benefit are 
still stricter. Beneficiaries are required to have been contributing for at least 18 
months during the past two years, whereas in Spain the requirement is 12 months' 
contributions over the past six years. The replacement ratio in Spain (70%) is higher 
than in Portugal (65%) during the first six months' benefit, although the opposite is 
the case as from the seventh month. 
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The comparison is less direct as regards the maximum duration of the 
insurance benefit. In Spain, this is linked to years of service in the job, whereas in 
Portugal it depends on the age of the unemployed worker. As we can see from Tables 
A6.1 and A6.2, the insurance system is seen to be more generous in Portugal, as from 
1989, for short years-of-service periods (between 18 months and three years), with 
generosity increasing in step with the age of the unemployed worker. On the contrary, 
the system is more generous in Spain for lengthy years-of-service periods, except for 
workers aged 50 or over. Specifically, as from 6 years of completed service, the 
insurance benefit is more generous in Spain for all workers under 50 years of age. 
In both countries, to qualify for assistance benefits, the unemployed are 
required not to have an income higher than a certain percentage of the minimunl 
wage, the replacement rate being set in terms of the minimum wage. Generally, 
assistance benefits are considerably more generous in Spain when the unemployed 
worker has family responsibilities (see Tables A6.1 and A6.2). 
A relevant aspect for consideration on assessing the generosity of 
unemployment benefits, when these are set as a percentage of the previous wage, is 
the level of these wages which, as we shall see in the next section, shows notable 
differences in both economies. Generally, the level of the average or median wage 
in Portugal is relatively low compared with Spain. Furthermore, as we could see in 
the wage distributions in Figure 17, the average benefit paid is higher up on the 
distribution in Portugal (25 percentile) as compared to Spain (10 to 15 percentile) 
This may reflect the fact that individuals receiving benefits in Portugal used to eam 
wages higher up in the distribution, as compared with Spain. Furthermore, if we 
compare the individual characteristics of the unemployed' according to benefit 
receipt, the most striking figure is the very high proportion of those aged 45 to 64 
among those receiving benefits in Portugal (43% of those receiving, compared to 19% 
of those not receiving). This is the group for which unemployment benefits in 
Portugal are the most generous. 
Such a share of older people among those receiving benefits is very high even 
compared to Spain where younger people are less likely to receive benefits because 
they are more likely to be on short temporary contracts. Currently in Spain, most of 
, We consider here unemployed up to 17 months unemployment. 
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those who do not achieve benefit entitlement are people who previously held a 
temporary contract. The widespread use of temporary contracts is an additional reason 
for the reduction in the unemployment benefits coverage rate in Spain since the end 
of the 1980s. 
In conclusion then, the generosity of unemployment insurance exhibited 
important differences prior to the nineties, when the benefits system in Portugal was 
virtually non-existent. In Spain, by contrast, the replacement rate was up to 80% 
against a background of progressively widening coverage. Since the start of the 
nineties, both coverage and the replacement rate have drawn notably closer. 
Currently. for six OT more years of tenure, unemployment insurance remains more 
generous in Spain, except for the unemployed over SO. Moreover, the assistance 
benefit is more generous in Spain provided the unemployed worker has family 
responsibilities. We should also take into account that the replacement ratio in Spain 
has, as a reference, higher real wages than those prevailing in Portugal. 
3. CoUective Bargaining 
Although the regulations governing collective bargaining are very similar, in 
practice Portugal shows significant wage flexibility compared to Spain. 
In both countries a minimum wage is set each year by law. Collective 
bargaining agreements additionally set a starting wage for each of the occupational 
categories established in their agreement, which ultimately act as minimum wages. 
However, an important difference here between Portugal and Spain is that these 
minimum wages for categories are set at a much lower relative level in Portugal, 
giving the employer much more room for manoeuvre than in Spain. In fact, there is 
evidence that actual wages significantly exceed industry-wide agreements in Portugal 
but not in Spain. Dolado, Felgueroso and Jimeno (1997) compare agreed and actually 
paid wages in Spain and they conclude that agreed wages are binding for unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers. In Spain the minimum agreed wage does not include only 
the basic wage but also various wage supplements that were extensively developed 
under Franco's dictatorship. Following the legalisation of trade unions, these 
supplements became part of the basic wage, inducing a significant rise in the 
minimum wage established in collective agreements. As a result, wage structure in 
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Spain faced not only high minimum wages but also a variety of them, one for each 
occupational category within a collective agreement'. 
In Portugal, unions negotiate collective agreements solely on behalf of their 
affiliates, with affiliation varying across sectors. Multi-unionism is predominant and 
"a priori" co-ordination between unions is not frequent. The negotiation process 
ultimately results in an agreement which is extended to all workers at the industry 
level. By contrast, in Spain union representation is not linked to affiliation but to 
union elections. The number of representatives is therefore linked to the number of 
all employees in the finn. The law establishes that only the most representative 
organisations are allowed to negotiate, and an absolute majority is needed to reach 
an agreement. In fact, in Spain there are only two main unions (UGT and CCOO). 
Each of them is a confederation of unions at the industry level which are supposed 
to follow the general indications established at the national level. Moreover, the high 
co-ordination between UGT and CCOO makes it easy to extend, with the help of 
"statutory extensions", homogeneous wage increases at the national level. The 
statutory extension, which is applied in both countries, stipulates that a multi-level 
agreement should cover all firms in a certain sector unless a firm-level collective 
agreement exists. 
Although the structure of collective bargaining in both countries is very 
similar, the different representation criteria for unions reduces markedly the 
possibilities of extending unifonn conditions at the national level in Portugal. Wage 
flexibility in Portugal is possible mainly because wage conditions at the sectoral level 
are set in terms of levels, with unions finding it difficult to set wages above the 
national minimum wage for low categories. Firms with actual wages exceeding the 
industry-wide minimum could set lower wage increases or even reduce wages until 
reaching the minimum level set in the industry-wide agreement. On the contrary, in 
Spain, negotiation is in tenns of rates of growth of wages which are applied to the 
different minimum -and relatively high- wages set in each collective bargaining 
agreement. Indeed, although Spain faces a rragmented collective bargaining structure, 
in which sectoral agreements at the regional level predominate, high union c0-
ordination favours the centralisation of wage increases, which are in fact closely 
related to the CPI. As a result, finns find it very difficult to adapt to the specific 
, The 1994 and 1997 refonns opened the way for setting new minimum wages for a 
more rational group of occupational categories. 
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circumstances facing them. Unlike in Portugal, Spanish employers have frequently 
sought to escape multi-level agreements. Before 1994 this possibility required an 
agreement between employers and unions at the finn level, but this is difficult to 
achieve since, in the event of disagreement, finns will automatically follow the multi­
level agreement. The 1994 labour market refonn included a "drop-out clause" which 
would be activated when a finn were suffering structural losses. In Portugal it is not 
frequent to seek less favourable conditions than the minimum sectoral-wide 
agreements. Nevertheless, in this case the negotiation will proceed with the 
intermediation of the Ministry of Employment. These difficulties may explain the low 
incidence of finn-level collective agreements in both countries which are possible 
only by setting more favourable conditions than their corresponding sectoral 
agreement. In Portugal this type of agreement is found mainly in public-sector firms. 
The much higher minimum wages per category agreed at the different 
bargaining levels in Spain reflects partly the greater power of Spanish unions. In 
countries such as Spain and Portugal where the statutory extension is in force the 
usual measures of union density are rather unrepresentative, given the little incentive 
for workers to join a union when, in any event, they are going to benefit from their 
achievements. According to OECD figures, trade union membership in Spain is 
significantly lower than in Portugal, although the figure is on a marked falling trend 
in both countries. However, unions in Spain are funded by the govemment according 
to their representation in elections for workers' representatives, in contrast to Portugal 
where they have to rely on their members' contributions. A different measure of 
union power would be to use the number of wage-eamers whose remuneration is 
covered by collective agreements, but nor is this alternative a realistic approximation 
to union power in countries where the statutory extension is the nonn. According to 
this measure, coverage in both countries is very high. 
Another way of measuring union power is through industrial action. Of all the 
OECD countries, Spain ranked second after Greece, and at a great distance from the 
other developed countries, as regards industrial disputes. Furthermore, unlike in the 
other OECD countries, there was no clear downward trend in industrial disputes in 
Spain. Moreover, there is evidence that Spanish legislation is not particularly 
permissive compared with most EU countries (see Milner and Metcalf, 1995). In 
Spain, days lost due to strikes (deflated by the number of employees) are over five 
times those in Portugal. A possible reason for such differences in behaviour may be 
precisely due to the effect of higher unemployment benefits and higher employment 
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protection of permanent employees in Spain. Given very high dismissal costs (higher 
than Portugal and much higher than those of temporary workers), their insider 
position is much stronger. 
Higher wage settlements in Spain may also reflect differences in employers' 
associations between Spain and Portugal. This would be the case if employers' 
associations in Spain reflected the interests of large high-wage paying firms to a 
stronger degree than in Portugal (due to the massive nationalisation of large firms in 
Portugal after 1975). 
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III. COMPARING PARTIC IPATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPOSITION 
I. Labour force participation and employment 
If present, differences in the course of labour force participation could provide 
an obvious accounting explanation for the different unemployment paths of Portugal 
and Spain. 'In Spain, female panicipation has increased around ten percentage points 
since the mid-1980's, after a prolonged period of stability. However, Portugal also 
witnessed such an increase over that period, despite the fact that female participation 
staned at a much higher level than in Spain for all age groups (see Figure 3). On the 
other hand, in Spain male participation has been declining considerably since the 
1970's, as in many other European countries, in contrast to Portugal where there has 
been a less clear decrease. Therefore, overall, participation in Spain declined until the 
mid-eighties and has remained more or less constant since 1985, with the decrease 
in male participation being compensated by the female increase, while in Portugal 
panicipation has increased since 1973 (see Figure 2). 
Related to these increases in female activity, Spain has experienced a sharp 
change in the composition of employment which could be thought to generate 
adjustment problems, particularly unemployment. The increase in the proportion of 
non-manual employment since 1980 for Spain (0.83% per annum) has been one of 
the highest of the OECD countries, due to a combination of technological progress 
and, more importantly, a growing weight of services (see Bover (1997». However, 
here again Portugal has experienced an even higher growth in its share of non-manual 
employment (0.97% per annum). These changes in the demand for labour in both 
countries have opened up new opportunities for women, who have seen their market 
wage increase. In both countries they have reacted by increasing their participation 
and their educational level. Moreover, if we compare the employment shares by 
sector (see Figure 4), it is clear that the dismantling of agriculture has been as severe 
for both countries, the rise in services has been similar, and so too have developments 
in manufacturing. The share of General Govemment in the service sector is, 
nevertheless, higher in Spain, partly due to the development of the regional authorities 
during the 1980s. 
There is one feature of the composition of employment which is markedly 
different in the two countries, namely the proportion of temporary employees. As we 
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mentioned in Section II, at the end of 1984, in an attempt to reduce employment 
protection, new fixed-term contracts were inttoduced in Spain, with lower firing costs 
than the permanent contracts. This prompted an important increase in employment, 
and in the proportion of temporary workers (see Figure 5), reaching well over 30% 
of the labour force. This is almost three times the figure for Portugal where the 
proportion of temporary work moved between 10% and 13% during the 1990's. As 
a consequence of the reform, job turnover increased in Spain (see Dolado, Garcia­
Serrano and Gomez, 1997). 
2. Unemployment composition 
We now tum to examine to what extent the characteristics of the unemployed 
are the same in Spain and Portugal. By sex, the unemployment rate is evenly split in 
both countries. Before the mid-1980's in Spain, and the early 1990's in Portugal, 
female shares in unemployment rates in the two countries stood at a much higher 
level (see Figure 6)'. Since then, male and female rates have been very similar, with 
the female unemployment share being continuously slightly higher in Portugal, while 
in Spain for some of the 1990's male unemployment in fact exceeded female 
joblessness. 
By age (see Figure 7), in both countries young people (aged 20 to 29) account 
for most of the unemployment, although their share in Spain is somewhat larger 
(41.6% compared to 36.3%). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in Spain their share 
has been decreasing since the mid-<:ighties, probably due to the inttoduction of 
temporary contracts. The very young (up to 19) have seen their share decrease to the 
lowest level (less than 10%) both in Portugal and in Spain, probably as a result of 
extended schooling. The most striking fact that emerges from looking at the 
unemployment shares by age has been the swift rise in the proportion of unemployed 
aged 45 to 64 in Portugal from 1989. 
, This convergence of unemployment rate shares by sex observed in Figure 6 may be 
due in part to the spectacular increase in non-manual employment observed in both 
countries during those periods, which was favourable to women. However, there were 
methodological changes in the Labour Force Surveys in the two countries precisely 
at the periods of change. Nevertheless, the Spanish data are homogeneous series 
consttucted by the Statistical Office. 
-17 -
There is one important way in which, until recently, the situation of the 
unemploYed has been very different in Portugal as compared to Spain, and this is in 
the receipt of unemployment income. Indeed, until 1985 the unemployment benefit 
coverage in Portugal was very low, well below the Spanish figures (see Figure 8). 
Furthermore, even at present eligibility conditions in Portugal are stricter, and the 
replacement ratio is less generous during the first 6 months than in Spain. This 
difference in generosity would be even more pronounced if it were taken into account 
that wages are lower in Portugal, as we shall argue below. Another significant 
difference is that in Spain, since 1985, the proportion of assistance benefits to total 
coverage has exceeded the proportion of insurance benefits, while in Portugal the 
reverse is true since 1989. 
During the fifties and sixties, unemployed people in Spain tended to migrate 
both abroad and to the more prosperous regions. On the contrary, since the 1980's, 
following the expansion of the welfare state, poor and high unemployment regions 
(like Andalusia and Extremadura) have become net immigration regions, while the 
better-<>ff ones, such as Madrid and Catalonia have become net outrnigration regions. 
Furthermore, data from the Labour Force Survey for the period 1987-91 reveal that 
only 31.2% of the unemployed would accept a job implying a change of residence. 
Antolin and Bover (1997) find that the register system at the Spanish Public 
Employment Office (INEM) and, possibly, unemployment benefits, prevent migration 
from acting as a mechanism to equilibrate unemployment. We do not have 
comparable data for Portugal but, in contrast to Spain, Portuguese high uneinployment 
agricultural regions such as Alentejo (comparable to Extremadura) have seen large 
population losses during the I 980s. 
As for emigration abroad, if we take emigrants' remittances relative to GDP 
as an indicator, the stock of emigrants abroad has been much higher for Portugal than 
for to Spain during the late 1970's and early 1980's. This is in accordance with the 
drop in migration flows abroad observed in Spain from the mid-1970's which could 
be thought to have contributed to the rise in unemployment at the time. However, in 
1975 Portugal experienced the mass immigration of half a million people fleeing the 
ex-colonies after independence. 
Concerning long-term unemployment, Figure 9 shows that the proportion of 
the unemployed who stay unemployed a year or more has followed a surprisingly 
similar pattern since the early eighties in the two countries, but at a quite higher level 
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in Spain (around 55% on average as opposed to 36.2%). Table 2 shows a more 
detailed breakdown of the unemployment stock by duration. The difference between 
Portugal and Spain is substantial. There is a much higher proportion of long-term 
unemployed in Spain which suggests that one of the problems of Spanish 
unemployment is long unemployment durations. Comparing the proportions of 
long-term unemployed for a "good" and a "bad" year (see Table 2 and the note to the 
Table) we see that with adverse conditions the proportion of long-term unemployed 
increases in Portugal, while in Spain the reverse happens, with an increased share of 
shorter durations due to higher inflows into unemployment. It is important to note 
that in Spain, in a good year, around 70% of the unemployed in short durations (less 
then a year) come from a temporary job, with the rest coming from 
permanent-=ntract jobs. The latter are responsible for 49% of the unemployment 
durations between 12 and 18 months. In a bad year the unemployed with previously 
temporary jobs increase their share uniformly in all durations. In the next section we 
shall discuss the factors that may affect unemployment durations and, in particular, 
the role of unemployment benefits. 
Finally, the flows from employment into unemployment in Spain are 3.5 times 
those in Portugal (see Figure A.2 in the Appendix), which is the counuy where these 
flows are the lowest among the European Union. These higher flow rates from 
employment to unemployment in Spain are mostly the consequence of the turnover 
rate of temporary workers in Spain. These inflows into unemployment behave 
cyclically, increasing in "bad" years in the two countries. 
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IV. FLOWS OUT OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
The Portuguese and Spanish quarterly Labour Force Surveys are identical in 
many respects. They use similar questions, employ analogous methodologies and have 
the same rotation structure. Since each individual is interviewed during six 
consecutive quarters, it is possible to obtain fTom the raw individual records 
information about translMns among labour market states (employment, 
unemployment, and inactivity). Here we are mainly concerned with transitions out of 
unemployment. From the information on elapsed unemployment duration for each 
unemployed individual, we can compute the transition rates to employment (or to 
inactivity). This can be achieved by simply dividing the number of individuals 
reporting a given elapsed duration that move into employment (or inactivity) during 
the subsequent quarter, by the total number of individuals with the same elapsed 
unemployment duration. Such calculation provides the empirical probability of exiting 
unemployment during the next quarter, given that the person has been unemployed 
until then. 
Computing these conditional probabilities at different durations, we obtain the 
empirical hazard function (or exit rates fTom unemployment), which shows how the 
chances of re-employment change as the length of the spell of unemployment 
progresses. Non-ronstant hazard functions are said to exhibit duration dependence. 
It is very common to find evidence of declining unemployment hazard rates. A 
number of factors may contribute to this outcome. First, skill depreciation during the 
spell of unemployment makes the individual less employable. Second, stigmatisation 
of long-term unemployed by potential employers leads to decreasing arrival rates of 
job offers. Third, discouragement effects lower search intensity. Fourth, unobserved 
individual heterogeneity causes "spurious" negative duration dependence because in 
the presence of heterogeneous individuals the sample of those still unemployed is 
increasingly made up of those workers with unobserved characteristics which make 
them less employable. 
We have evaluated empirical hazard rates for comparisons between Portugal 
and Spain for a period after the Portuguese reform in 1989. All the hazards are based 
on a sample of men aged 20 to 64 for each country. In Figure 10 we present the 
empirical hazard functions for Portugal and Spain by the state of destination. Given 
the much higher unemployment rate in Spain, it is striking that for the first nine 
months or so, the transition rates into employment are higher in Spain. This puzzle 
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may be partly explained by looking at Figure I I. In Spain, there is a very important 
difference between the exit rates to a temporary job and to a pennanent one. For the 
first nine months, the hazard rate into a temporary post is over four times that into 
a permanent one. This is in sharp contrast with Portugal where the hazard rates for 
the two types of contract are very similar and in between the Spanish exit rates to 
temporary and permanent contracts. The high proportion of temporary contracts in 
Spain could in part explain the higher aggregate exit rate in Spain compared to 
Portugal. However, at the same time, those exiting unemployment into a 
temporary-contract occupation, in high numbers in Spain, will enter again the pool 
of the unemployed. It would also be interesting to compare the empirical hazards for 
longer durations. In what follows, we will examine empirical hazards by different 
characteristics. 
The behaviour of unemployment benefits reCIp,ents compared with non­
recipients does not differ much between Portugal and Spain (see Figure 12). In both 
cases unemployment benefits recipients move to employment at a significantly lower 
pace than non-recipients. An analysis of hazard functions by age group (see 
Figure 13) indicates, again, a similar pattern between Portugal and Spain that is 
coherent with the benefit systems in each country. In both cases, workers aged 20 to 
29 do not seem to behave differently from workers aged 30 to 44. Workers aged 
between 45 and 64 years face significantly lower probabilities of leaving 
unemployment compared with the other two age groups. However, in Portugal this 
probability is much lower than for the other two groups (and compared to Spain). 
This could be explained by the generosity of the benefit system (in terms of benefit 
duration) for older workers in Portugal. These patterns are consistent with the 
empirical hazard functions obtained for different levels of tenure in the previous job 
(Figure 14). Workers displaced from long-tenure jobs have much more difficulties in 
leaving unemployment than short-tenure workers. However, those coming from very 
short-tenure jobs in Spain have a much distinctly higher hazard of leaving 
unemployment than those with previously longer tenure as compared to Portugal. 
Here again this may be due to the fact that Spanish benefit duration increases with 
tenure rather than with age as in Portugal. 
Figure 15  shows that in Portugal and Spain individuals who are unemployed 
due to the end of a contract move into employment at a faster rate than those that are 
looking for a first-job or were dismissed from their last job. However, it seems that 
first-job seekers have better prospects of finding a job in Portugal than in Spain. On 
- 2 1 -
the other hand, Spanish unemployed workers that have been dismissed appear to have 
initially higher exit rates than their Portuguese counterparts, which probably reflects 
the fact that many dismissals in Spain involve people with temporary contracts. 
Cyclical down rums and uprums in the economy are expected to affect the out­
flows from unemployment. In Figure 16 empirical hazard functions are graphed for 
boom and recession years. As expected, hazard rates are higher when economic 
activity is strong and lower when it is weak. However, the impact of the business 
cycle is not the same in both countries. For Portugal, the hazard function for 1992 
(a "good year") crosses at around twelve months the one for 1 995 (a "bad year"). 
This does not happen for Spain, where the hazard of leaving unemployment in a good 
year (1 989) is higher at all durations. A possible explanation is that in Portugal, in 
a good year, the unemployed find a job more easily and the ones left with long 
durations are, for example, the "less" employable, by some unobserved characteristics. 
On the contrary, in a bad year more employable people are left at long durations 
given the difficulty in finding employment. This would fit the effect of the business 
cycle on the aggregate distribution of durations explained in Section m. 
In the previous analysis of empirical hazards we have seen that the factor that 
has the most important impact on exit rates, both in Portugal and in Spain, is whether 
the individual receives unemployment benefits or not. To assess how significant these 
effects are and to control for personal characteristics and the business cycle, we 
estimate an econometric ttansition model. The estimation results presented in Table 
3 indicate that sizeable effects of unemployment benefits remain even after 
accounting for observed individual and time heterogeneity. In fact, after insulating the 
effects of age, schooling, tenure and sector in the previous job, head-<lf-household 
starus, and cyclical and seasonal differences, being a recipient of unemployment 
benefits reduces significantly the probability of getting a job. This effect is higher for 
Spain, where the odds of leaving unemployment for those without benefits is 1.8 
times those with benefits, than for Portugal where the odds ratio is 1.5 (see columns 
I and 5 in Table 3). The higher effect of unemployment benefits in Spain probably 
reflects a higher level of benefit amounts compared to Portugal'. 
, Note that benefit amounts are not observable at the individual level in the Labour 
Force Survey. 
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The age and tenure coefficient estimates appear to be remarkably similar for 
Portugal and Spain. However, unemployment insurance rules differ markedly between 
the two countries with respect to maximum duration of benefits. Whereas for Portugal 
potential duration of benefits depends solely on the age of the individual (the older 
the unemployed the longer the duration of benefits), for Spain the duration of benefits 
is determined by the tenure on the previous job (see Table A4). In order to account 
for those differences we interacted the age and tenure variables with the 
unemployment benefit dummy. The influence of duration of benefits is clearly borne 
out in the estimation (see columns 2 and 6 in Table 3). Older individuals receiving 
unemployment benefits exit unemployment at a significantly lower rate in Portugal 
than in Spain, while individuals with longer tenure in the previous job exit 
unemployment at a significantly lower rate in Spain than in Portugal. 
In all the previous specifications the coefficients on the elapsed duration 
dummies exhibit negative duration dependence. That is, the hazard rates decline over 
the spell of unemployment. Human capital depreciation, stigmatisation, or unobserved 
individual heterogeneity may account for this outcome. Nevertheless, the exhaustion 
of unemployment benefits (or the decline in replacement rates, as in Spain) should 
have, after some critical point, a counter-balancing effect on the hazard rates. In order 
to accommodate the possibility of a time-varying effect of the unemployment benefits 
we also interacted this variable with the logarithm of elapsed unemployment duration . 
In both cases, the effect of unemployment benefits appears to decline with duration 
of unemployment, most notably for Spain (see columns 3 and 7 in Table 3). This 
evidence is consistent with the results provided by Bover, Arellano, and Bentolila 
(1996) for Spain, and by Portugal and Addison (1997) for Portugal. 
Finally, the specification presented in columns 4 and 8 from Table 3 allows 
for time-varying effects for all the explanatory variables. Two points seem worth 
noting. First, this new set of results does not disrupt our previous findings. And 
second, comparing the two countries there is an indication that tenure in the previous 
job influences the escape rates from unemployment in an opposite way. That is, at 
the beginning of the spell of unemployment, tenure in the last job affects negatively 
the exit rates in Portugal but this effect fades rapidly over time. For Spain, initially, 
tenure impacts positively on exit rates but, again, this effect diminishes as the spell 
of unemployment progresses. 
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V. WAGES 
If we compare the monthly wage distribution for full-time workers for the two 
countries ( 1 994 for Portugal, 1 995 for Spain, see Figure 17), one striking difference 
is the huge proportion of people earning the economy-wide minimum wage in 
I'ortugal while in Spain this proportion is minimal. This may be a result of the fact 
that the minimum wage as a percentage of the average wage is higher in Portugal, 
and also a result of the wage bargaining process in both countries, as we saw in the 
previous section. This also means that increases in the overall minimum wage are not 
an issue strongly fought for by the unions in Spain. Therefore, the reduction in the 
minimum wage as a proportion of the average wage observed in both countries (see 
Figure 18) has actually only been felt in Portugal. 
Another important difference is the level of wages in the two countries, with 
wages in Portugal being much lower. If we deflate the average wage in Portugal and 
in Spain by the corresponding Purchasing Power Parity' to eliminate price level 
differences between both countries, we obtain 1 0 1 7.65 for Portugal in 1994 and 
1 995.84 for Spain in 1995. This is a substantial difference even after taking into 
account wage increases in Portugal between 1994 and 1995. The difference is higher 
in terms of PPP deflated median wages, the median wage in Spain being well over 
twice that in Portugal. 
On the other hand, wage dispersion in Portugal is higher than in Spain. For 
full-time workers, the ratio of the 90 to the 1 0  percentile is 4.25 in Portugal and 3.58 
in Spain. If we measure dispersion relative to the median (ie (90 percentile-IO 
percentile)/50 percentile), we obtain an even higher dispersion for Portugal ( 1 .96 as 
compared to 1 .50). Moreover, if we look at other data sets, which are not strictly 
comparable to the ones used for Spain in Figure 17, it appears as if wage dispersion 
seems to have been increasing more in Portugal than in Spain during the 1 980's'. As 
i. clear from the figure, the higher dispersion is due to a longer and fatter upper tail 
in Portugal, while the bottom 50% of the distribution is more compressed in Portugal 
than in Spain. Indeed, the ratio of the 50 to the 1 0  percentile is 1.65 in Portugal, 
lower than the figure for Spain at 1.72. 
, Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, May 1997. 
, This information is taken /Tom individual Social Security records over the period 
1 980-1987. 
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Both the lower level of wages and the broader difference between top and 
bottom wages seem to reflect the weaker power of unions in Portugal (for some 
results on the importance of union power effects on wages for Spain, see Bover, 
Bentolila and Arellano, 1997). Some further informal evidence on the weaker power 
of unions in Portugal is given by Figure 19, which reflects the changes in average 
wages and wage settlements. In Spain average wages have been consistently above 
wage settlements by a significant amount, while in Portugal they have been close 
together, with wage settlements sometimes above average wageslO,II, 
Aside from these differences in the overall distribution of wages between the 
two countries, there are also differences in the conditional distributions by age, 
tenure, and skill. In Table 4 we present some wage comparisons according to certain 
individual characteristics between Portugal and Spain. Important differences arise for 
young and short-tenure workers, who in Portugal earn a higher proportion of their 
country overall average wage than in Spain. For example, 20 to 24 year-<>lds earn 
29% less than the average in Portugal but almost 55% less in Spain. Another 
difference is in the average wages earned by highly educated workers, who earn 2.8 
times the average wage in Portugal but only twice the average wage in Spain. 
The segmentation of the labour market in Spain between temporary and 
permanent workers may have produced, as argued in Bentolila and Dolado (1994), 
a differential wage bargaining power between permanent and temporary employees, 
resulting in higher wages for the former. However, since wage increases by categories 
in collective agreements apply to all workers in that category regardless of their type 
of contract, differences in wages between permanent and temporary workers may 
alternatively be attributed to differences in categories (which may themselves result 
from differences in bargaining power, but also from differences in firm specific 
skills). A negative effect on wages of the high turnover of temporary workers is that 
it prevents them from acquiring firm specific human capital. This negative effect is 
likely to be important in view of the high returns to tenure observed in other 
countries. As an illustration, in 1995, the average wage of permanent employees was 
10 Although this difference may be the result of sectoral aggregation and different 
employment composition within sectors, employment shares by sectors are similar in 
the two countries. 
1 1  In 1989 there was an important methodological change (before, fixed-term 
employees were excluded), although in theory it was accounted for by the Statistical 
Office. 
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1 .7 to 2.3 times that for temporary employees, controlling for education. In contrast, 
in Portugal permanent employees earned between I I  % and 64% more than temporary 
ones, the biggest differences occurring for secondary and university education, where 
the number of temporary workers in Portugal is very small. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite many similarities in the labour market institutions of Portugal and 
Spain, in this work we have identified three main differences that may be potentially 
important for understanding the large disparities in the unemployment rates between 
the two countries. 
Firstly, there are differences in unemployment benefits. Before 1985 the 
difference was extreme since Spain enjoyed a generous system while in Portugal it 
was virtually non-existent. After 1989, although both countries have come closer in 
this respect, Spain still has a higher proportion of the unemployed covered by what 
is a more generous benefit system, even more so considering that the amount of 
benefits is set as a percentage of the previous wage, and that the level of wages is 
much lower in Portugal. Looking at transition rates out of unemployment, we have 
seen that in both countries receiving benefits lowers the probability of leaving 
unemployment, but more so in Spain. In Portugal, where benefits are more generous 
for older people, the hazard for the unemployed aged 45 to 64 is much lower than 
in Spain, and much lower than for the rest of the age groups in Portugal. In Spain, 
where benefits generosity varies according to tenure, it is mostly short-tenure people, 
i.e. temporary workers, that have the higher hazards of leaving unemployment. 
Secondly, there are differences in wage flexibility. Minimum wages by 
category established by collective agreements are set at a lower relative level in 
Portugal, giving employers more room for manoeuvre than in Spain. In Spain, 
however, there is a sharp contrast between the wages of temporary and permanent 
employees. Moreover, unions in Spain are more active, as measured by days lost on 
strikes. 
Finally, it is also the case that, in practice, firing costs in Spain have been 
higher than in Portugal. This difference, together with more generous unemployment 
benefits and the insiders power of employees on permanent contracts, may also help 
to explain' the stronger power of unions in Spain. 
If we apply the model of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) to the Portugal-Spain 
comparison, the difference in the unemployment benefit system between the two 
countries prior to 1989 might alone explain the very different unemployment rate 
rises of the early 1 980s. Both countries suffered the oil shocks and a re-structuring 
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of their economies due to the growing importance of services and to technical 
progress. Workers who become unemployed in such circumstances see their skills 
depreciate rapidly. But in Spain, contrary to Portugal, they maintained high 
reservation wages due to unemployment benefits. At the end of the seventies and 
early eighties wage rigidity in Spain was probably an added reason for the very 
different pattern in unemployment rates. In Portugal, unlike Spain, wages were 
adjusted downward, and employment was not destroyed as it was in Spain. 
At present, high minimum wages by category, with a more compressed wage 
distribution, hampers the employment probabilities of workers with low productivity 
and low reservation wages. First-time job seekers have a more difficult time in 
finding employment in Spain than in Portugal, and the unemployment share of young 
people is higher in Spain. We should, however, bear in mind that a low 
unemployment equilibrium in the labour market can be associated with either strong 
or weak worker flows. In the latter case, which corresponds to the characterisation 
of the Portuguese labour market, employment protection, by eliminating desirable 
separations, may have important efficiency losses on output and welfare (Blanchard 
and Portugal, 1998). 
In summary, we tentatively come to the conclusion that a key factor in 
explaining the different Portuguese and Spanish unemployment experiences since the 
late seventies appears to be the wage adjustment process. In rum, we believe that the 
wage adjustment process in the two countries may have been influenced by the 
unemployment benefit system and, to a lesser extent, by the degree of job protection. 
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Table 3 :  ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC HAZARDSL 
Individllal Charoclnutia: POR11JGAl. SPAIN 
Benefits ..{l3113 -0.052 -0.459 -<1.202 ·<>.600 -0.485 -0.975 -0.842 
(4.50) (0.28) (1.90) (0.64) (35.20) (13.84) (23.23) (12.98) 
Benefits x log Dur 0.260 0.11l 0.347 0-'" 
(2.63) (0.73) (21.35) (7.81) 
Benefits x tenure -0.019 -0.027 -0.022 -0.035 -0.062 -0.149 
(0.62) (0.88) (0.30) (4.03) (6.98) (8.10) 
Benefits x tenure x log Our - -0.018 0.045 
(O.SO) (5.01) 
Benefits x tenure' 0.0003 0.0005 -<1.002 0.0006 0.001 0.004 
(0.30) (O.SO) . (0.43) (\.79) (3.8S) (5.58) 
Benefits x tenu� x log Our 0.001 -0.001 
(\.53) 0·77) 
Benefits x Age 25-29 -0.095 -0.132 -0.105 -0.019 -0.033 -0.011 
(0.35) (0.49) (0.16) (0.39) (0.68) (0.12) 
Benefits J[ Age 25-29 J[ lot Dur -0.007 -0.026 
(0.02) (0.51) 
Benefits x Age 30-44 -0.263 -0.329 -0.733 -0.007 -0.024 -0.277 
(I.38) (1.47) ( 1.32) (O.IS) (0.54) (3.33) 
Benefits x Age 30-44 x log Our 0.233 0.141 
(0.81) (3.09) 
Bentfits x Age 45-64 -<l.S64 -0.662 -0.529 -0.248 -O.27S -0.471 
(2.22) (2.58) (0.11) (4.92) (5.49) (5.02) 
Benefits x Age 45-64 x log Our -<1.046 - 0.102 
(0.1S) (\.99) 
Age 25-29 -0.08S -0.082 -0.070 0.022 -0.042 -0.042 -0.041 0.048 
(0.72) (0.61) (0.52) (0.01) 0.73) (U1) CU2) (0.82) 
Age 25-29 I[ lot Dur -<1.063 -0.056 
(0.43) (\.91) 
Agc 30-44 -0.147 -0. 102 -0.085 0.335 -0.)05 -0.1)6 -0.1 IS 0.182 
11.26) (0.79) (0.65) (I.16) (4.02) (3.66) (3.66) (3.03) 
Age 30-44 J[ log Our -<1257 -0.114 
(1.7S) (5.94) 
Age 45-64 -0.532 -0382 -0.355 0.123 -0.523 -<1392 -0.392 -0.009 
(3.86) (2.17) (2.01) (0.32) (16.54) (9.74) (9.62) (0.12) 
Age 45-64 x los Our -<116' -0.230 
(1.37) (5.76) 
Ter!ure in previous job -0.022 -0.014 -0.012 -0.124 -0.022 -0.002 0.009 0.071 
(1.48) (0.75) (0.65) (3.20) (4.84) (0.24) (1.34) (S.12) 
Tenure J[ log Our 0.072 - -0.031 
(3.26) (4.55) 
T.",,,,, -<1.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.004 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.002 
(0.70) (0.7S) (0.85) (3.16) (O.SS) (1.61) (2.6S) (3.93) 
T� x log Dur -0.003 0.0006 
(3.51) (2.53) 
Se«lndary Education -O.llO3 0.005 O.OIS 0.396 0.021 0.021 0.023 -0.030 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.21) (1.94) (1.06) (\.07) (\.18) (O.SO) 
Secondary I�ion x log Our -<1.201 - - 0.033 
(2.06) (1.71) 
University f.ducatioo 0.130 0.142 0.158 0.429 -0.105 -0.098 -0.1\9(\ -0.146 
,0.51) (0.55) (0.62) (0.68) (2.32) (2.16) (1.91) (1.61) 
Univ=ity l:ducation x log Our -0.112 0.039 
(0.31) (0.8S) 
Head of household 0.196 0.193 0.186 0.209 0.404 0.395 0.379 0.451 
(1.94) (1.90) (1.84) (0.88) (18.68) (18.24) (17.43) (11.17) 
Head of hou.\OChoId x log Our -0.018 -O.04S 
(0.16) (2.34) 
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Table 3 :  ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC HAZARDS (cent) 
Secroro/ OIId Ti",� Dummies PORTIJGAL SPAIN 
Manufacturing -0,253 -0.263 ".264 -0.161 -0.368 -O.3S1 -0.368 -0.363 
(1.93) (2.00) (2.01) (0.5S) (13.19) (12.17) (13.10) (6.91) 
Manufacturing x log Our -0.058 0.008 
(0.41) (0.281) 
Construction 0.136 0.123 0.120 0.314 -0.258 ".2>4 .. .n3 -0.231 
(1 .03) (0.92) (0.9) (1.34) (10.81) (10.11) (11.4\) (5.49) 
Construction x log Our - -0.154 -0.017 
""'''' -0.329 -0.341 
(J.()6) 
-0.351 -0.543 
(0.68) 
".468 ".463 -O.4TI ·0.566 
Cl.51) (266) (2.12) (1.90) (18.98) (18.13) (19.23) (12.51) 
Services x log Our 0.096 0.061 
(0.68) (2.43) 
1m 0.046 0.041 O.OSO O.OSI 
(1.39) (1.41) (1.50) (I.S2) 1989 0.079 0.081 0.084 0.087 
(2.37) (244) (2.51) (258) 1990 0.066 0."" 0.010 0.012 
(1.96) (2.01) (206) (2.10) "" 0.0001 0.002 0.0007 0.001 
(0.00) (0.06) (0.02) (0.005) 1992 -0.329 -0.321 -0.331 -0.336 
(9.84) (9.S0) (9.86) (9.99) 1993 -0. lOS -0.101 -0.093 -O.09S -0.449 -0.441 -0.445 ·0.4S2 
(0.11) (0.74) (0.68) (0.69) (13.89) (13.82) (13.68) (13.86) 1994 -0.173 -0.183 -0.179 -0.177 -OJI}  -OJ08 -OJ05 -0.312 
( 1.31) (1.31) (1.34) (1 .32) (S.I I )  (8.02) (1.90) (8.01) 199' ·0,257 -O.2S3 -0.252 ".260 
0.88) (I.SS) 0.84) (\.88) 
1996 0.033 0.039 0.042 0.042 
(0.2S) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) 
""""" "" -0.352 -0.352 -0.354 -O.3S1 0.108 0.107 0.112 0.112 
(3.46) (3.46) (3.48) (3.49) (4.94) (4.92) (S.\]) (5.11) Third quarter -O.IS2 -O.ISO -0.160 ..(1.155 -0.014 -0.014 ..(1.012 -0.010 
(1.53) (1.51) 0.60) (uS) (0.51) (0.56) (0.49) (0.42) Fourth quaner -O.01S -0.011 ..(1.073 ".on -0.120 -0.120 -0.121 ..(1,116 
(0.12) (0.68) (0.10) (o.n) (5.06) (S.OS) (5.01) (4.8S) 
Number of panmelm 47 " " fI) so " 56 n 
Nwnber of spells S699 S699 S699 S699 90717 90717 90717 90717 
Avenge Log likelihood -0.421 -0.420 -0.419 -0.411 -0.526 -0.525 -O.S23 -0.522 
NOles: 
1. HlI.lios in parentheses. 
2. In all the spedfications Jq)Or1cd we include monIhly duration dummies ror spells up 10 24 months and quanerly dwa1ion dummies for 25 to 36 monIh spells. 
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Table 4 
Wage indices by characteristics' 
All workers 
By gender 
Men 
Women 
By age 
1 5  to 1 9  
20 to 24 
25 to 29 
30 to 34 
35 to 39 
40 to 44 
45 to 49 
50 to 54 
55 to 59 
By education 
Completed primary education 
Secondary education 
Junior college 
Senior college 
By years of tenure 
Less than one 
I to 4 (Portugal) 
I to 3 (Spain) 
1 5  to 19 (Portugal) 
1 6  to 20 (Spain) 
Portugal 
1 993 
100.0 
1 12.0 
80.3 
53.6 
70.9 
90.0 
102.8 
1 1 2.1  
120.1 
130.7 
129.8 
1 1 8.1  
8 1 .7 
128.4 
228.8 
278.3 
78.2 
87.6 
128.2 
I .  General government and non-market services are excluded. 
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Spain 
1 995 
100.0 
108.7 
73.0 
28.1 
45.5 
69.3 
90.7 
104.5 
1 1 6.7 
127.5 
130.0 
123.5 
84.8 
1 1 8.5 
154.9 
197.0 
33.2 
74.1 
120.5 
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DATA APPENDIX 
A.t. Data Base Description for Portugal 
I .  Infonnation relating to long-term labour market series (unemployment rates, 
and sectoral employment) is obtained from "Series Longas", Banco de 
Portugal ( 1997); the unemployment rate series from 1 992 to 1996 is obtained 
from the Labour Force Survey (JNE). 
2. Infonnation on the composition of the stock of unemployed and on incidence 
of fixed-term contracts was gathered from the "lnquerito ao Ernprego", 
Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (1983-1996). 
3. Aggregate data on wages (private-sector wage settlements, wage gmwth, and 
minimum wages) are taken from the Banco de Portugal annual reports. 
4. Empirical hazard rates and the flows between employment, unemployment and 
inactivity, and regression estimates for the econometric transition model were 
computed from the individual records of the "Inquento ao Emprego", Instituto 
Nacional de Estatistica for mainland Portugal over the period 1 992-96. 
Average figures for wages by type of contract are also obtained from that 
source for 1 996. 
5. The empirical wage distribution was estimated using the individual records 
from the "Quadros de Pessoal" survey, Ministerio para a Qualifica9i!0 e 0 
Emprego (March, 1994). 
6. Earning indices by characteristics come from the "Enquadramento Estatistico 
dos Activos - Anuario das Estatisticas Sociais", Statistics Department of the 
Ministry of Employment. 
7. Unemployment benefit coverage was obtained dividing the number of benefit 
recipients as reported from the Social Security Services (at December each 
year) by the number of registered unemployed from the Public Employment 
Services. 
8.  Participation rates are defined as the ratio of Active Population (starting at 15) 
to Population aged 15 to 64 (OECD). 
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A.2. DATA BASE DESCRIPTION FOR SPAIN 
Unemployment rate: Source: from 198711, "Encuesta de Poblacion Activa" (EPA), 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE); before 198711, Garcia-Perea and GOmez 
(1994) 
Participation rates: Population in the labour force. (starting at 16). Source: OECD 
Total population, aged 15  to 64 
Employment by sectors. Source: from 198711, EPA, INE; before 198711, 
Garcia-Perea and Gomez (1994) 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Construction 
Mmet services: total employment in services minus employees in general 
government 
General govemment: employees in public-sector firms and institutions 
Fixed-term contracts: Source: EPA, INE 
Unemployment by sex.: Source: EPA, INE 
Unemployment by age: Source: EPA, INE 
Unemployment duration: Source: EPA, INE 
Unemployment benefit coverage: Insurance and assistance benefi!, 
Registered unemployment 
where, 
Insurance benefits exclude part-time unemployment. Source: "Boletin de 
Estadisticas Laborales". Ministry of Employment. 
Assistance benefits and registered unemployment include the special scheme 
for seasonal agricultural workers in Andalusia and Extremadura. Source: 
Ministry of Employment. 
Minimum wage: Source: "Boletin de Estadisticas Laborales". Ministry of 
Employment 
- 45 -
Monthly wage distribution: Source: "Encuesta de Estructura Salarial 1995" (INE) 
Wage indices by characteristics: Own calculations based on "Encuesta de Estructura 
Salarial 1 995", INE. 
Real wage settlements: Wage settlements 
Consumer Price Index 
Wage settlements: wage settlement increase agreed in collective bargaining before 
including the inflation-adjustment safeguards. Source: "Estadistica de convenios 
colectivos de trabajo". Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs 
Real monthly wage: _--"M",o"n",th",l�y--,w",a",g",e,-_ 
Consumer Price Index 
Monthly wage: regular payments of monthly eamings, by employee. Regular 
payments exclude arrears due to inflation-adjustment safeguards and other payments 
of a periodicity greater than one month. Source: "Encuesta de Salarios 1995". INE. 
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Table A3 
FINANCIAL COSTS (measured in terms of Dumber of montbs' wages (mwl) 
PORTUGAL SPAIN 
Notice given 2 m  a) Prior to 1994 refonn (I-3m) 
b) 1994 reform (1m) 
Severance pay: 
Fair, by number of one month's wages 20 days' wages per year worked 
years worked per year worked 
9 months 3 mw 0.5 mw 
4 years 4 mw 2.6 mw 
20 years 20mw 1 2 mw 
max there is no maximum l2 mw 
Unfair, by number of one month's wages 45 days' wages per year worlc.ed 
years worked per year worked 
9 months 3 mw 1 . 1  mw 
4 yean 4 mw 6 mw  
20 years 20 mw 30 mw 
max there is no maximum 63 mw 
Indirect cost a) Prior to 1994 reform 
wages payable pending a legal ruling 
and potential appeals lodged by the 
firm (on average 4 months' wages) 
b) 1994 reform 
If the employer acknowledges that the 
dismissal is unfair in conciliation, the 
employee is only entitled to receive 
the wages payable pending the legal 
ruling from the date of dismissal to 
that of the conciliation, this �ng on 
condition that the employer places the 
severance payment at the employee's 
disposal, depositing it with the court 
in the 48 hours following the 
conciliation. 
The foregoing obligation of the 
employer to pay the employee wages 
is lifted while the appeal lodged by 
the firm against the sentence declaring 
the dismissal to be unfair runs its 
coune. 
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